Wednesday, February 28, 2018

Fixing Healthcare Part 3B: Changes in the delivery of care




The changes I proposed in the organization of health care would bring down the cost significantly. However, I think changes in the delivery of health care beyond what is done anywhere else could have further benefits in reducing the medical industrial complex starting with . . .

Health maintenance: When you first walk in to your doctor’s office the first thing that happens is  - data entry.  You give your demographics and your insurance information and now in a new wrinkle they ask if you are anxious or depressed, if you smoke or if you drink. This happened to me at my orthopedist’s office. None of this data collection requires the skill of a doctor.  Furthermore, the most effective solutions involve specific programs or providers that address those specific problems – the mental health counselor for those who are anxious or depressed and substance cessation programs for patients who drink or smoke.  Adding some simple vital signs and basic blood work would identify problems and direct patients to resources that would actually help them.  All of this could be done with an app without the input, and cost, of a high priced health care provider with an advanced degree.

Computer medicine: Doctors do two things; diagnose, which is pattern recognition, and treat, which always involves risk/benefit analysis.  Both of these processes are precisely what computers are good at and very probably could supplant the clinician.  For a variety of real technical as well as emotional issues that could be a stretch. However, at the very least computers could render a second opinion. As an example, radiology is all about pattern recognition. In England mammograms are read by two radiologists.  In a study they had a computer do the second reading and got results comparable to two radiologists. [1]

Technical care: Sometimes diagnoses or treatment require procedures or surgery.  Sometimes these procedures require operator discretion such as a lot of general surgery and neurosurgery. For example, a surgeon doing exploration and excision in the abdomen for cancer must identify the cancer and its extent and decide what and how he must remove what he has found. However, a lot of procedures and surgeries are routine repetitive. I would submit that technicians trained for the specific task could do a lot of these.
For example, back in the 90’s when sigmoidoscopy was the standard screening procedure for colon cancer Canada had trained nurses do the procedure with results, as would be expected comparable to doctors.[2]
I would submit that there are a large number of surgical procedures that are chronically repetitive could be done at least as well by trained technicians as it is by doctors with nearly a decade of training past medical school.

Surgical outcomes are most highly correlated with operator experience[3], and manual dexterity.[4] [5] Neither of these qualities are screened when candidates are judged by standardized testing. 

I would suggest that procedures such as colonoscopies and arthroscopies and surgeries such as cataract operations and joint replacement could be done by technicians based on their manual dexterity and their demonstrated expertise over time. Training and even a healthy low six figure salary would be a fraction of the cost of the current arrangement.

To the best of my knowledge no developed country does any of this but that isn’t to say that it can’t be done and in a fixed cost health care system there would hopefully be the motivation to experiment in this direction.

In my next installment I will talk about some odds and ends but mostly about malpractice.







Sunday, February 18, 2018

Fixing Healthcare Part 3A: The organization of care



In order to implement the GHE accountable care organizations (ACO’s) would have to be created.  ACO’s are large group of physicians who would be responsible for the complete care of the several 100,000 lives who have enrolled with them. The Mayo clinic and Kaiser Permanente are groups that have already functioned in this way for decades. 

However, medical groups have been moving in this direction for a number of years so new groups could form to function in this coordinated fashion.  As an example in Rhode Island one could conceive of a metro group that would include Rhode Island and Miriam hospitals (med/surg/peds) along with Women and Infant’s (Ob/Gyn) and Butler/Bradley (psych) and all the physicians who admit to those institutions.  Another group might be northern Rhode Island and include Roger Williams, Fatima, and Landmark.

Patients choose the group they wish to belong to and groups are paid on a monthly basis.  If someone moves from Boston to Chicago they can start up with a new group at the first of the month.   If they don’t like the group they are in they can move to the group across town.

Compensation: Groups could design whatever compensation system they deemed appropriate.  However, the fee for service model would be a non-starter so all groups would have some sort of salary model. 

The following is a model I would propose that would quickly mitigate health care expenditures for the group.  Physicians would be compensated with a base salary plus incentives for care outcomes, and patient satisfaction.  There could be additional incentives for providers who create programs or procedures that improve outcomes or efficiency.  Different specialties would have additional incentives.  For instance, the specialty of primary care would have incentives for lifestyle improvements and screening compliance.  Surgeons would be would have incentives for weighted* surgical outcomes and low morbidity.  Furthermore all of these metrics would be public information so patients can make informed judgment about what group they choose to belong to. 
           
Another adjustment that, introduced over time, would create significant savings would be to make the base salary the same for all doctors regardless of specialty.  Specialists are not any more talented or intelligent than primary care physicians.  The only rational reason to compensate them at a higher level is that they have deferred salary by extending their training.  This could be addressed by either paying all doctors in training the base salary or having groups that hire specialist pay them the difference between their training salary and the base for the number of years beyond the minimum (3) they spent in additional training.  The object would not be to increase the pay of primary care but to have specialists regress to that base and thus create savings.
Such a system then shifts the incentive from adding care to optimizing care thus correcting the fundamental underlying problem with the cost of healthcare. All this can be done by restructuring medicine in a direction it is already heading and changing compensation from fee for service to salary plus incentives.